

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 192940
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:LRFLEISCHER

APPROVED BY:S/S-O:LRFLEISCHER

-----050918 161123Z /15

O 160920Z AUG 77 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

FOR ASST SEC MOOSE

FOLLOWING REPEAT DAR ES SALAAM 3290 SENT ACTION SECSTATE AUG 15.

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 3290

NODIS

DEPARTMENT PASS LONDON, LUSAKA, PRETORIA, USUN IF DESIRED

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: RH, TZ

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT NYERERE ON RHODESIAN PROBLEM

RF: A) STATE 192562, B) STATE 192569

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYERERE MORNING AUGUST 15 RECEIVED
PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER (REF A) VERY WARMLY. HE EMPHASIZED
THAT GUT ISSUE WAS WHAT WILL BE DONE NOT ONLY ABOUT SMITH BUT
ABOUT SMITH'S ARMY. HE AGREES UNCONDITIONALLY WITH STATEMENT
OF PRINCIPLE ON THIS SUBJECT CONTAINED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER,
BUT ON BASIS HIS CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN ON
AUGUST 13 HE DOUBTS THAT OWEN ACCEPTS PRINCIPLE OR HAS ANY IDEA

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HOW TO IMPLEMENT IT. THEREFORE, HE DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN CALL
HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES TOGETHER UNTIL THERE IS CLARIFICATION
FROM THE BRITISH ON EXACTLY WHAT THEY INTEND TO DO WITH SMITH'S
ARMY. THIS CLARIFICATION COULD BEST COME TO HIM DIRECTLY FROM
THE BRITISH BUT HE WOULD ACCEPT IT FROM US. MEANWHILE, HE WILL
HAVE HIS FOREIGN MINISTER BEGIN PREPARING FOR A MEETING OF THE
FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. NYERERE REITERATED HIS PROMISE TO

PRESIDENT CARTER TO CALL THE MEETING TO HEAR OWEN AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG AS SOON AS CLARIFICATION IS OBTAINED, BUT FEELS TIMING WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO BE AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE LAGOS CONFERENCE. END SUMMARY.

2. I DELIVERED PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER (REF A) TO PRESIDENT NYERERE MORNING AUGUST 15 IMMEDIATELY AFTER MY RETURN TO DAR ES SALAAM. NYERERE SAID THE LETTER WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE WANTED. IT CONFIRMED THAT HE AND PRESIDENT CARTER IN WASHINGTON AND HE AND SECRETARY VANCE IN LONDON HAD UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER PERFECTLY. SPECIFICALLY, NYERERE AGREED THAT THE PRESENCE IN RHODESIA DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD OF ACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS FROM THE PREVIOUS RHODESIAN FORCES WAS AGREEABLE TO HIM (TOGETHER, OF COURSE, WITH UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCES, AND LIBERATION FORCES WHICH WILL BE BASE OF ARMY OF INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE.)

3. HOWEVER, ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALK WITH OWEN IN LONDON AUGUST 13, NYERERE DOUBTED THAT THE BRITISH HAD YET ACCEPTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S PRINCIPLES OR HAD ANY IDEA HOW TO IMPLEMENT THEM. FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S AND SECRETARY VANCE'S INFORMATION ONLY, HE CAME AWAY WITH THE FEELING THAT OWEN WOULD ACTUALLY LIKE TO PRESENT A HALF-BAKED PLAN WHICH THE AFRICANS WOULD HAVE TO REJECT. WHEN NYERERE REPEATED TO OWEN HIS UNDERSTANDINGS WITH SECRETARY VANCE, INCLUDING IDEA THAT NUMBER OF FORMER RHODESIAN FORCES TO BE MAINTAINED WAS CRITICAL, OWEN SAID SECRETARY VANCE MUST NOT HAVE UNDERSTOOD PLAN. OWEN SAID THEY WOULD GET RID OF
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SELOUS SCOUTS IMMEDIATELY BUT THAT WAS ALL HE HAD TO SAY. NYERERE NEEDS TO KNOW THAT UK IS GOING TO DO MUCH MORE THAN THAT. ALL OWEN WOULD SAY WAS UK NEEDED TIME TO WORK THINGS OUT. UK SSPTOAPGLTPT SEEMED TO SHARE US URENCY BUT AT SAME TIME KEPT TALKING ABOUT NEEDING TIME. TO NYERERE, OWEN HAD JUST NOT GONE FAR ENOUGH FOR NYERERE TO BE ABLE TO TRUST HIM AND CALL MEETING. THE JOB NOW, NYERERE SAID, IS TO GET UK TO BE AS SPECIFIC AS PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER ON THE FORCES QUESTION AND TO GET IT TO DO SOMETHING TO INSPIRE MORE CONFIDENCE THAN OWEN HAD INSPIRED LAST SATURDAY IN LONDON.

4. LET US ASSUME SOME ELEMENTS OF SMITH ARMY WILL BE INCORPORATED, NYERERE PROPOSED. THE UK ALONE CANNOT DETERMINE WHICH AND HOW MANY. IT MUST AGREE WITH THE LIBERATION AND UN OR COMMONWEALTH FORCE COMMANDER. ALL THREE FORCES WILL BE THERE ON T-1 (TRANSITION DAY ONE), BUT WHAT IS THE MECHANISM FOR T-2, ETC. THE "FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS" MUST BE TO GET THE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS OF SMITH'S ARMY (AND NOT JUST THE SELOUS SCOUTS) OUT OF THE WAY. NYERERE DOESN'T HAVE TO KNOW ALL THE DETAILS. HE AND HIS ASSOCIATES MUST, HOWEVER, HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE UK DOES NOT INTEND FOR SMITH'S ARMY TO LAST THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD BECAUSE, IF IT DOES, INDEPENDENCE -- EVEN WITHOUT SMITH --

WILL NOT BE REAL. HE THINKS OWEN SEES THE SMITH ARMY AS PER-
SISTING THROUGHOUT THE TRANSITION PERIOD. "WHEN THE BRITISH
DITHER, I AM SUSPICIOUS. OWEN DITHERED."

5. THROUGHOUT HOUR OF INTENSE CONVERSATION, NYERERE EMPHASIZED
HIS ACCEPTANCE OF AND GRATITUDE FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S BONA
FIDES. HE OVERRODE FOREIGN MINISTER MKAPA'S MILD QUERY ON
MEANING OF PHRASE IN PRESIDENT'S LETTER THAT ARMY OF INDEPENDENT
ZIMBABWE WAS TO BE ONE OF ZIMBABWE'S OWN CHOOSING. (MKAPA
WANTED TO KNOW WHETHER WE WERE POSSIBLY PREEMPTING THAT CHOICE
BY REST OF FORMULATION.) NYERERE SAID THIS WAS NOT CASE.
PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID IT RIGHT AND HE AGREED WITH IT.

6. IF PRESIDENT CARTER CAN GET A MESSAGE BACK TO HIM THAT THE
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BRITISH DO INDEED INTEND TO DISMANTLE SMITH'S ARMY SO THAT IT
PROMPTLY LOSES THE POWER TO CONTROL EVENTS AND THAT THE BRITISH
REALLY KNOW HOW TO DO THIS, NYERERE WILL CALL HIS COLLEAGUES
TOGETHER IMMEDIATELY. IN SOME WAYS, HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE BETTER
IF UK GAVE HIM THE NEEDED CLARIFICATION DIRECTLY. AND NYERERE'S
GUESS IS THAT THE US WILL HAVE TO DO SOME ARM-TWISTING TO GET
LONDON TO DO THAT.

7. AS TO THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' MEETING, NYERERE PROMISED
PRESIDENT CARTER HE WOULD CONVENE IT TO HEAR SECRETARY OWEN
AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG, AND HE WILL DO SO AS SOON AS HE GETS THE
NEEDED CLARIFICATION OF THE BRITISH POSITION. HE WOULD DO IT AT
ONCE BUT HE THINKS AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE LAGOS CONFERENCE
IS PREFERABLE. MEANWHILE, FOREIGN MINISTER MKAPA WILL GET
IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES AND BEGIN PREPARATIONS.
MKAPA IS TO TELL OTHERS OF NYERERE'S INTENTION AND TO SAY HE IS
AWAITING CLARIFICATION ON A FEW POINTS.

8. COMMENT: ON WHAT SEEM TO BE TO BE TWO KEY POINTS:

(A) NYERERE UNEQUIVOCALLY ACCEPTED THE FORMULATION ON FORCES
IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S LETTER. I BELIEVE HE WILL STICK TO IT. IF
FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN BELIEVES NYERERE REVERSED HIS POSITION
WITH HIM, IT MAY WELL BE BECAUSE NYERERE FEELS OWEN DID NOT LIVE
UP WITH NYERERE TO THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENTS. (WE BOTH NOTED AT
THIS POINT THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SAID NOT EVERYTHING HE AND
NYERERE HAD AGREED TO WAS NECESSARILY AGREED TO BY THE BRITISH.)

(B) ON THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS' MEETING, I PUSHED NYERERE AS
HARD AS I COULD FOR A MEETING THIS WEEK. HE DID NOT RESENT MY
EFFORTS AND DID NOT ABSOLUTELY FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY. HE
EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS SURE PRESIDENT CARTER WANTED
THE THING THEY HAD AGREED TO DONE RIGHT AND, AS OF THE MOMENT,
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HE DID NOT BELIEVE OWEN WAS PREPARED TO DO IT RIGHT. HE INDICATED HE COULD ALSO BENEFIT FROM A LITTLE MORE TIME TO GET HIS FRONT LINE COLLEAGUES "READY" AND THAT HE WOULD CLEARLY FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE WITH A MEETING AFTER THE LAGOS CONFERENCE.

WHAT MORE CAN AND SHOULD BE GOTTEN FROM THE BRITISH -- AND HOW -- IS OBVIOUSLY SOMETHING ONLY WASHINGTON CAN DECIDE. NYERERE IS CAPABLE OF SLICING THE SALAMI PRETTY FINE, BUT I BELIEVE HE IS SINCERE AND THAT, IF SOMETHING CAN BE DONE TO RESTORE HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE BRITISH, HE WILL LIVE UP TO HIS PROMISES. NYERERE SAID HE WOULD LET ME KNOW WHAT HE HEARD FROM THE BRITISH AND WOULD APPRECIATE OUR LETTING HIM KNOW WHAT WE HEAR.

10. SHOULD TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS PROVE INADEQUATE TO HANDLE THIS MATTER, IT MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING HAVING AMBASSADOR YOUNG ALONE (I.E., NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY UK REPRESENTATIVE) COME HERE (PERHAPS STOPPING IN LONDON EN ROUTE) BEFORE HE GOES TO LAGOS, WITH THE AIM OF SETTING UP AN OWEN-YOUNG MEETING WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS AFTER LAGOS.
SPAIN UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, ARMED FORCES, CAT-A, NATIONALISTS, NEGOTIATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 16-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE192940
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: O:LRFLEISCHER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: N770004-0823
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770857/aaaabvzz.tel
Line Count: 195
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 1ed1f759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1587851
Secure: LOCK1
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRESIDENT NYERERE ON RHODESIAN PROBLEM RF: A) STATE 192562, B) STATE 192569
TAGS: PDEV, MILI, RH, TZ, US, UK, (NYERERE, JULIUS K), (CARTER, JIMMY)
To: LONDON
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/1ed1f759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009